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Taking Stock of Myanmar’s Ethnic Peace 
Process and the Third Twenty-First Century 
Panglong Conference
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The Third Panglong Peace Conference convened in Naypyitaw in July 2018 has led 
to the accession of two more armed groups to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
bringing the total number of signatories to ten groups now. Conversely, this 
development has weakened the United Nationalities Federal Council that previously 
housed the non-signatories collectively. There were far less agreements this time 
around and major sticking points include the military’s insistence that the armed 
groups agree not to secede from the Union of Myanmar which the latter have refused 
thus far. The military is also interested in discussing disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration while the armed groups are keen on broader security reforms. 
China again facilitated the Northern Alliance’s attendance of the meeting.
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Introduction
The Myanmar government convened the Third Twenty-First Century Panglong 
Conference in the country’s administrative capital city Naypyitaw in July 2018. 
This is the third meeting of a new series of peace dialogues initiated by the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) government that came into power in 
April 2016 and was meant to build on the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
(NCA) that was signed between eight ethnic armed groups and the Thein Sein 
government in October 2015. Consequently, it is part of an ongoing process that 
is meant to eventually lead to the cessation of violence between the armed groups 
and the military.
There were a number of notable developments in the lead up to the 
Conference. The first of these was the accession of two more armed groups to 
the NCA. Both the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic 
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Union (LDU) signed onto the process, bringing the number of signatories up to 
ten groups now. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) was originally 
expected to sign on as well but had a change of heart. Other major developments 
include the negative sentiments echoed by many of the signatories to the process, 
the Chinese facilitation for the presence of the leaders of the Northern Alliance 
at the Conference, and the continuation of armed conflict between members of 
the Northern Alliance and the military. Additionally, there have also been several 
instances of fighting between NCA signatories and members of the Northern 
Alliance. 
This article seeks to trace the current state of the ethnic peace process and 
identify the major developments that have occurred in the lead up to the July 
Twenty-First Century Panglong Conference. Organizationally it is divided into 
five major sections. The first section traces the major developments that have 
occurred between the Second and Third Panglong Conferences. The second 
section then identifies the major issues during and after the Third Conference and 
the following third section identifies the gains and setbacks to the process that 
have occurred thus far. The fourth section places the entire peace process within 
the broader national context and how it has impacted the relationship between 
the ethnic armed groups and the government and the military and how those 
developments have in turn impacted the country’s overall political process and 
democratic transition. Finally, the fifth section examines the impact of China’s 
mediation in the peace process.
Major Developments Leading Up to the Third Panglong Conference
The most significant development in the lead up to the Third Panglong 
Conference was the accession of two more ethnic armed groups to the NCA 
in February 2018. While there were earlier expectations and even premature 
announcements that the NMSP and the KNPP would sign onto the NCA, that 
optimism fell through (Lun Min Mang 2017). The KNPP was extremely critical 
of an incident in which it accused the military of executing four of its members 
in cold blood. Notwithstanding a number of meetings over the issue it was 
never really resolved. The NMSP is a smaller armed group while the LDU is 
even smaller, so while the new signatories increased the number of signatories 
committed to the NCA, the situation was not a major breakthrough. However, it 
should be noted that the Mon are well represented in many parts of the country 
including Yangon and boast an older and more refined civilization than the 
majority Bamar ethnic group.
These new accessions again weakened the United Nationalities Federal 
Council (UNFC) that had previously served the corporate interests of the non-
signatories to the NCA. The three remaining members are the Karenni National 
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Progressive Party, Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army, and the Arakan 
National Council/Arakan Army. And since the Shan State Progress Party and 
the Arakan Army also claim membership in the Northern Alliance that is led by 
the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the KNPP was to all intents and purposes 
the only remaining member of the UNFC and that hardly made it a collective 
corporate entity. Shortly afterwards, however, the UNFC announced that it 
had accepted back two other armed groups that were previously part of the 
grouping. The two groups are the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Kachin 
National Organization (KNO) (Chan Thar 2018). Nonetheless, the departure 
of the NMSP and the LDU have continued the weakening of the UNFC as the 
premier representative of the non-signatories, and given the recent trajectory of 
developments it is likely to become even less relevant over time. Consequently, 
the two major corporate groups are now the NCA signatories and the Northern 
Alliance.
The Northern Alliance was formed in late 2016 with seven ethnic armed 
groups that are non-signatories to the NCA. And among these seven, four of 
them—the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KNO/A), Arakan Army 
(AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang), and 
Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—are in a state of active combat with 
the Myanmar military. In fact, since the current NLD-led government took 
office in April 2016, fighting between these groups and the military has not 
abated. Rather it has intensified significantly in the northern Shan states and in 
Kachin state. Recent attempts by the military to gain ground in the gold, amber, 
and jade mining areas in Kachin state in particular has led to a large number 
of internally displaced persons. Since April 2017, the Northern Alliance has 
been led by the UWSA and it has indicated that it is not in favor of the NCA as 
currently constituted. Additionally, the group insists on collective negotiations 
with the government and has sought the assistance of China to be an honest 
broker between it and the government. The Union Political Dialogue Negotiating 
Committee (UPDNC) is the official interlocutor representing the Northern 
Alliance.
While this dynamic was ongoing among the non-signatories, the Karen 
National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (KNU/KNLA), which is the 
largest ethnic armed group among the signatories, voiced concern over the 
seemingly stalemated situation in the peace process. In fact, the KNLA was 
involved in armed conflict with the military in Phapun district in Karen state in 
March 2018 (Nyein Nyein 2018a). While the military claimed that it was building 
a road in the area, the KNLA stated that it was not informed of the intrusion 
into its territory as required under the terms of the NCA (Karen News 2018). 
Additionally, the KNLA fears that road construction will simply facilitate the 
military’s transport and deployment of heavy weapons in the area. This conflict 
and subsequent clashes led in turn to the displacement of some 1,500 Karen 
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civilians from the neighboring areas.
The Chairman of the KNU, General Saw Mutu Say Poe, was even more blunt 
in his criticisms of the peace process and the Panglong Conferences. During a 
meeting of the Peace Process Steering Committee (PPSC) of the ethnic armed 
groups that brings together NCA signatories held in Chiangmai, Thailand in 
early July, he pointed out the need to recognize the existing diversity in the 
country and the importance of amending the 2008 Constitution in order for the 
peace process to progress. He then went on to add that para 22 (d) of the NCA 
explicitly recognizes the need to amend, supplement, and cancel laws arising 
from the Union Peace Conference (Maung Htoo 2018a). Earlier in May, the KNU 
Concerned Group, which is comprised of some current and retired KNU leaders, 
noted that dependence on the military for all security matters works against the 
cessation of conflict. The group went on to claim that the NLD government does 
not have the power to work with the ethnic armed groups to secure peace (Lawi 
Weng 2018b). Finally, it noted that the military’s ongoing actions threaten to 
derail the NCA, which will in turn destabilize the peace process and lead to a new 
round of conflict.
The Karen Peace Support Network, an organization that is comprised of 
more than twenty Karen civil society groups, similarly accused the military of 
blocking attempts to build a federal political system in the future (Naw Betty Han 
2018a). It also noted that the government and the military have thus far utilized 
the peace process simply to centralize power and consolidate their land and natural 
resource holdings. While there was a short respite to the fighting following a 
meeting between KNU chairman General Saw Mutu Say Poe and Senior General 
Min Aung Hlaing in late May, the fighting restarted in August and a total of fifty-
seven skirmishes were reported between March and October (Naw Betty Han 
2018b). All in all, it may be noted that the Karen community is clearly dissatisfied 
and unhappy with the way the peace process is evolving and is seeking to publicly 
place its grievances on record.
Major Issues in the Third Panglong Conference
When it was held in July 2018, the Third Panglong Conference had already been 
postponed four times. This postponement is in line with previous meetings 
when the ethnic armed groups regularly seek more time to discuss issues with 
their constituents and also hold meetings between themselves in order to try 
and coordinate their positions. Notwithstanding such attempted coordination, 
the groups have always complained that the military simply stonewalls them 
on issues that it is unprepared to discuss. They also note that the military 
constantly references the 2008 Constitution during negotiations. The military 
has also required the armed groups to renounce the threat of secession from 
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the Union when negotiating federalism. This offer was one of the important 
safeguards offered to the ethnic groups by General Aung San when he negotiated 
the Panglong Agreement in 1947. Consequently, the NLD government’s choice 
of name for the peace dialogue contains both promise and peril for the state 
(Ganesan 2017, 329).
Other issues that the armed groups have raised in the previous meeting 
include gender equality and 30 percent representation for women in the peace 
process. Especially important is the equitable sharing of land and natural 
resources between the government and the armed groups. For security issues, the 
armed groups are interested in broad based security sector reform that includes 
the formation of a federal army while the military appears only interested in 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of the ethnic armies. 
None of the ethnic groups, including the early NCA signatories, have endorsed 
disarming thus far and this is likely to be one of the most protracted and sensitive 
issues. It is likely that the armed groups will press for international monitoring 
of any such developments. Leading members of the armed groups have also 
noted that the military and the government appear to be on the same side during 
the negotiations and the former has indicated that it does not mind if the peace 
process fails (Nyein Nyein 2018c).
General Min Aung Hlaing’s speech at the Conference was considered 
controversial by the armed groups since he attributed the continued conflict 
to the groups rather than the government or the military. Additionally, his 
remark that the Myanmar military represents the state and the people drew 
swift condemnations from the armed groups and social media users. NLD party 
members and lawmakers were also unhappy with this sweeping assertion (Ye 
Mon 2018). These groups do not wish to be associated with the military that has 
been responsible for so much political violence in the country and do not regard 
the military as representative of their groups or aspirations.
The Northern Alliance was issued an invitation to attend the meeting 
and was present. Following a coordination meeting in Panghsang, the capital 
of Wa state, in early July, members of the seven armed groups in the Alliance 
attended the Conference through arrangements made by China from Yunnan 
province. This group has sought to negotiate with the government and military 
as a corporate body and has refused to sign the NCA as it stands having earlier 
asked for some revisions (Lawi Weng 2018c). The real surprise in the meeting 
was the Wa declaration that it would sign the NCA if it was allowed to withdraw 
from it later. Such a possibility was certainly not envisaged by the government 
or the military and the declaration, to all intents and purposes, fell on deaf 
ears. Interestingly, General Min Aung Hlaing met with only leaders of the four 
armed groups in the Northern Alliance that had preexisting bilateral ceasefire 
arrangements with the military. It may be recalled that this was the first stage 
prior to the peace process before it was consolidated at the state level followed 
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by the signing of the NCA at the national level. The four groups are the UWSA, 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA-
Mongla Group), and the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N).
The remaining three groups that are currently in active combat with the 
military, TNLA, AA, and MNDAA-Kokang, were hosted by Deputy Commander-
in-Chief General Soe Win instead (Ye Mon 2018). It might be noted that the 
KIA is also in a state of active combat with the military after its earlier bilateral 
ceasefire agreement collapsed in June 2011. While the UPDNC that represents 
the Northern Alliance had points for discussion, these were not entertained since, 
as non-signatories to the NCA, these groups only hold observer rather than 
participant status. 
When the meeting was concluded it was announced that there are plans 
to hold another meeting this year and two more in 2019. Given the history of 
postponements, a similar situation is likely to evolve. During her closing address, 
Aung San Suu Kyi also noted the importance of engaging in security sector 
reform as part of the peace process (ibid.). This is likely to be wishful thinking 
given the serious differences between the position of the military and the ethnic 
armed groups on such reform. 
Gains and Setbacks to the Peace Process
The ethnic peace process is an ongoing and fluid one that seeks to build on the 
2015 NCA. And as a process it has had its share of achievements and setbacks. 
Among its achievements, the most obvious is the fact that as a process it has 
continued. And notwithstanding misgivings on all sides, the fact that the process 
has continued without interruption is in itself an achievement. In other words, 
the simple fact that all the parties involved think it worthy to move the process 
forward is in itself an achievement. The second and perhaps most important 
structural achievement is the inclusion of the two new armed armed groups—
the NMSP and the LDU—into the NCA. This addition has increased the number 
of groups that have acceded to the NCA and should be regarded as a sign of 
progress. However, it should also be noted that the NMSP has registered negative 
sentiments after signing on to the NCA. Leaders of the group have indicated 
their frustration with the peace process despite having signed onto the NCA in 
February 2018 (Nyein Nyein 2018d).
The third major and visible achievement is the presence of members of the 
Northern Alliance at the meeting. Although the seven groups that are part of 
the Alliance have always articulated their preference for holding only collective 
meetings with the government and the military, their collective presence is an 
indication of the group’s continued engagement as part of a broader confidence 
building measure. Since the grouping brings together two of the largest of the 
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ethnic armed groups in the UWSA and the KIO/KIA, the group’s inclusion is 
important for any nationwide resolution of the conflict with the ethnic groups. 
The nuanced dynamics of the group’s meetings with the military in particular 
indicates the continued tense situation with three of the armed groups within 
the broad coalition that are currently in active combat. This point was driven 
home by the fact that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing met with the four groups 
with which that the military has a better past relationship—UWSA, NDAA, 
Shan State Progressive Party/Army (SSPP/SSA), and the KIO/KIA. Among these 
four groups, the military is also involved in heavy fighting with the KIA after 
the collapse of the bilateral ceasefire agreement in June 2011. Nonetheless, the 
existence of a previous agreement privileges the group in the eyes of the military.
It was the Deputy Commander Vice General Soe Win who met with the 
remaining three groups—the AA, MNDAA, and TNLA (Eleven Newsmedia 
2018a). In the past, the military has insisted on their complete surrender before 
their acceptance into the peace process. This distinction was made since these 
three groups are regarded as being of a relatively recent vintage, do not have an 
existing bilateral ceasefire agreement, and have staged brazen attacks on border 
towns and the military in the past. All three groups had also collaborated and 
fought alongside the KIA in the past prior to the formation of the Northern 
Alliance and its subsequent leadership by the UWSA.
Among the setbacks to the peace process is that fighting has continued 
unabated. On the one hand there is regular fighting between the military and the 
KIA, TNLA, and AA. In fact, engagements with the KIA have become much more 
intense and widespread as the government tries to wrest control of areas around 
the town of Lanai in Kachin state that are known for gold and amber deposits. 
Fighting with the TNLA and AA has also ratcheted up especially in the northern 
Shan states leading in turn to widespread displacement of civilian populations 
in both Kachin and Shan states and, thus, increasing the number of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). A second set of conflicts involves the Restoration 
Council of Shan States (RCSS) which is a signatory to the NCA and the TNLA 
and the SSPP/SSA. These skirmishes are mostly about territorial control and 
troop movements and have not let up. Similar skirmishes have sporadically 
occurred between the NMSP and the KNU since 2016, especially around Yephyu 
in the Tanintharyi Division (Lun Min Mang 2018). Consequently, fighting is not 
simply restricted to that between the military and the ethnic armed groups, but 
also includes inter-ethnic group violence.
Another setback has been the fewer number of items on the agenda in the 
most recent Panglong Conference and accusations that the military effectively 
has a veto on the agenda in terms of it not agreeing to discuss issues that are 
regarded as non-negotiable or out of bounds. Political issues typically fall into the 
first category and the ethnic groups charge that without inclusion of such items 
there cannot be progress in the dialogue process (Irrawaddy News 2018). For the 
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military, the ethnic armed groups should also renounce the right of secession, 
something that they are unprepared to do. On the issue of disarming, none of the 
armed groups have publicly indicated that they are willing to disarm, not even 
the early signatories of the NCA. In this regard, the armed groups regard the 
retention of weapons as the only sure way to ensure that their interests are not 
ignored and also an insurance should the peace process eventually fail. In fact, 
most of the ethnic groups have thus far utilized a twin policy of competing in 
the polls through legitimately registered political parties on the one hand while 
retaining fighting capacity on the other. This way they are able to take advantage 
of the democratic process and ensure parliamentary representation even as 
some of them violently engage the military. Most recently some parties have 
announced their intention to merge in order to seek stronger representation than 
that won in the 2015 election when there were a total of fifty-nine ethnic parties 
that accounted for a total of 64 percent of all registered political parties (Nan 
Lwin 2018a). That fragmentation had led in turn to a four percent decline in the 
number of seats won when compared to the 2010 election. Consequently, leaders 
of these parties feel that consolidation rather than fragmentation will yield much 
more positive results in electoral contestation in the future and parliamentary 
gains in the forthcoming 2020 national election. 
The Relationship between the Ethnic Armed Groups, Government, 
and Military
As mentioned in the previous section, whereas the relationship between the 
ethnic armed groups is well managed for the most part, some of the groups have 
been fighting among themselves over territory. Such occurrences appear most 
common in the Shan states and the Tanintharyi Division where the ethnic Mon 
and Kayin live in close proximity to each other. And while signatories to the NCA 
have generally been cordial towards each other and continue to hold meetings 
both before and after the Panglong Conference in order to present a united front, 
at the individual level they have often been unable to convene meetings for intra-
ethnic consultations at the state level. Such attempts have been thwarted by the 
military on a regular basis. 
Similarly, among the non-signatories grouped together in the Northern 
Alliance, the groups have generally co-existed peacefully. While four members 
of the group are in active combat with the military, this has not spilled over to 
the remaining three groups who regularly continue to meet under the leadership 
of the Wa or in China. Both the signatories and non-signatories also regularly 
meet in Chiangmai to coordinate their positions and iron out differences. In fact, 
shortly after the July 2018 Panglong Conference, the United Nationalities Alliance 
that brings together sixteen ethnic political parties issued a statement that peace 
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should be achieved on the basis of equality, autonomy, and the establishment of a 
democratic federal union in the spirit of the original Panglong Agreement (Min 
Naing Soe 2018). Additionally, the leaders of the groups have issued a statement 
that they will not offer a guarantee not to secede from the Union as it is currently 
constituted (Lawi Weng 2018d). The leaders maintained that this was the original 
position of the ethnic leaders at the 1947 Panglong Conference and since there 
has been little progress in the peace process there is no reason to abandon it. This 
position is naturally unacceptable to the military that has always maintained that 
the unity of the state and all territories is sacrosanct. The ethnic armed groups 
have already announced that the groups will meet in two stages—first a meeting 
of the NCA signatories and the second involving all ethnic armed groups—in 
order to coordinate their positions and iron out differences ahead of the Fourth 
Panglong Conference (Eleven Newsmedia 2018c).
The Impact of China’s Mediation
The Northern Alliance’s participation in the peace process continues to be 
arranged by China and its Special Envoy Sun Guoxiang who regularly visits 
Naypyitaw and meets with leading members of the government as well as the 
military. In this regard, China has consolidated its position as the intermediary 
between both parties and the Northern Alliance, many of whose members are 
ethnic Chinese like the Wa and the Kokang who regard China more favorably 
than the Myanmar government and military. In fact, it was China that arranged a 
meeting between the leadership of the KIO/KIA and the military in Tarli, Yunnan 
province in early August after the Third Panglong Conference (Eleven Newsmedia 
2018b). Unfortunately, nothing positive came out of that meeting.
China’s bilateral relationship with Myanmar has strengthened significantly 
recently and there are number of both internal and external reasons for this 
development. Internally, China’s ability to engage the Northern Alliance and 
regularly persuade its leaders to attend the Panglong Conference and negotiate 
with the Myanmar government and military has won it local recognition. The 
Northern Alliance has clearly indicated that it seeks support from China in the 
peace process (Nyein Nyein 2018b). While the military and government may not 
necessarily view the Northern Alliance’s close relationship with China as being in 
the country’s national interest, a more pragmatic approach to try and resolve the 
conflict has been adopted thus far. This pragmatic approach allows the Myanmar 
government and military to accept China as an honest broker in the peace 
process. And China has reciprocated this trust by attending to the mediation of 
the conflict seriously and with commitment and resources. The appointment 
of senior diplomat Sun Guoxiang who is devoted specifically to the process has 
also strengthened China’s involvement in the peace process. An indication of his 
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credibility is his regular meetings with top government officials in Naypyitaw and 
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing from the military. Most recently he arranged for 
a meeting between the three ethnic armed groups that the military had previously 
refused to deal with—the AA, MNDAA, and TNLA—and the government’s Peace 
Commission (PC) in Kunming, Yunnan province (Maung Htoo 2018b).
Externally, China has sheltered Myanmar from international criticism in 
the United Nations and related international bodies against its treatment of 
the Muslim minority in Rakhine state which has been terrorized and displaced 
(Reuters 2018). In fact, the Myanmar government does not even use the term 
Rohingya for fear that it would then allow the group to claim the same status 
as one of the original 135 ethno-linguistic groups that were catalogued by the 
British colonial government. Such a claim would entitle it to rights enshrined in 
the country’s Constitution as an indigenous group. And the harsh criticism of 
Myanmar’s treatment of this group and the military offensives against the Shan 
and Kachin groups has led to targeted sanctions against the military commanders 
deemed responsible. The atrocities against the Rakhine Muslim population, who 
are derogatorily referred to as Bengali to suggest that they are illegal migrants 
from Bangladesh, has been documented and there are efforts underway to 
repatriate them back to Myanmar. China regards such developments as falling 
within Myanmar’s domestic affairs although it has attempted to assist in the 
repatriation process and has arranged talks between the two countries. It is also 
interested in keeping Western countries and international organizations away 
from Rakhine state where it has significant interest and investments (Lawi Weng 
2018a). The port and oil and gas terminals at the city of Kyaukphyu are central 
to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to link China’s Yunnan province to the 
Indian Ocean. This linkage will allow the country to have strategic access to the 
Indian Ocean via a route other than the South China Sea where its presence is 
regularly contested. Additionally, the oil and gas pipelines allow China to bypass 
the Strait of Malacca for the transport of vital raw materials and save it time and 
money. 
The prison sentence meted out to two reporters from Reuters for documenting 
the massacres in Rakhine state has also resulted in Myanmar’s further 
international isolation. And the convergence of international criticisms and 
sanctions has once again had a displacement effect of drawing Myanmar closer 
to China. The last two years have witnessed large numbers of NLD lawmakers 
visit China with reciprocal visits from Chinese leaders and a strengthening of ties 
between the NLD and the Communist Party of China (CCP) as well (Htet Naing 
Zaw 2018; Nan Lwin 2018b). This was certainly the case from 1990 to 2010 when 
the country was exposed to wide ranging international sanctions before these 
were lifted in order to reward the Thein Sein government’s democratic reforms in 
2011. 
China has capitalized on this new found appreciation and gone on to 
 Taking Stock of Myanmar’s Ethnic Peace Process 389
strengthen its bilateral relationship with Myanmar in a number of other areas as 
well. For instance, the two countries signed a Strategic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement in April 2018 and an agreement has been reached to set up a 
Myanmar-China Business Council to promote trade and investments between 
the two countries (Nilar 2018a). And in September 2018, the countries signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to build a China-Myanmar Economic 
Corridor (Nan Lwin 2018c). The Corridor, estimated at 1,700 km in length, is 
expected to connect Yunnan province with the northern hub of Mandalay and 
from there to the southern hub of Yangon as well as the Kyaukphyu Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) where China already has substantial investments. The 
areas of cooperation are expected to include infrastructure, manufacturing, 
transport, finance, agriculture, telecommunications, and research and technology 
among others. 
The ethnic armed groups’ relationship with the government is primarily 
constrained by their relationship with the military. Since the NLD-led government 
has no effective control over the military and the Ministries of Defence, Interior, 
and Border Affairs, which are also beholden to the military, there is a real sense 
that the government does not control ground related developments in many 
areas where there is active fighting. As mentioned earlier, in the two years since 
the current government has been in power, fighting has actually flared in Kachin 
and Shan states. And such fighting invariably leads to the displacement of civilian 
populations in the affected areas leading in turn to a rise in the number of IDPs. 
U Win Myint, a close confidant of Aung San Suu Kyi who replaced U Htin Kyaw 
as President in March 2018, is much more politically conscious and active in 
commenting on national political issues from corruption to the rule of law. He 
has taken an active interest in the peace process as well and called for patience 
and magnanimity on the part of all parties.
The hope of the NLD leadership is to be able to persuade the military to 
change the 2008 Constitution in order to move the peace process forward. While 
it had attempted other means to make such changes, it now views the peace 
process as the way to go about doing it. Hence while adhering to its electoral 
promise to change the Constitution, it now views the ethnic peace process as 
the means to fulfill that promise. This logic is premised in the belief that the 
political demands of the ethnic groups and the crafting of a working federal 
system can only be obtained by changing the Constitution. In this regard, both 
the government and the ethnic groups appear to be united, albeit the military 
has thus far not budged from its position that the Constitution is sacrosanct and 




The Third Twenty-First Century Panglong Conference that was held in July 
2018 saw the accession of two more ethnic armed groups to the NCA of October 
2015 that was initiated by the Thein Sein government. The NCA now has ten 
signatories among the ethnic armed groups and the strengthening of this group 
has had a deleterious impact on the UNFC that previously represented the non-
signatories collectively. The Northern Alliance continues to remain aloof from 
the peace process as currently constituted although the UWSA’s statement that it 
would consider signing on to the NCA if it was allowed to exit from it afterwards 
is a new development. There has been no word on this development since then, 
and the KIO/KIA, AA, TNLA, and MNDAA from the Alliance continue to be in 
a state of active fighting with the military. China continues to be the facilitator for 
meetings between the Northern Alliance on the one hand and the military and 
the government on the other. While the process is continuing and fluid, many of 
the ethnic armed groups have expressed their disappointment and frustration at 
the absence of meaningful political dialogue and change. They have also indicated 
that they will hold on to their weapons and not abandon their right to secede, 
which was contained in the original 1947 Panglong Conference proclamation. 
The latter idea is anathema to the military and it is also trying to push for 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the ethnic armies. This is part 
of a fluid and ongoing process, but it does appear to be stalemated for now with 
the military being primus inter pares in the negotiation process. Finally, the NLD-
led government has signaled that it would like to change the 2008 Constitution by 
persuading the military to further the peace process. 
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